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Chapter 1
Introduction
With increasing carbon emissions from forest sectors in developing countries
in recent decades, REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation, plus foster conservation, sustainable management of forests,
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks) has been gaining momentum in in-
ternational discussion on mitigating climate change. REDD+ is expected to
help reduce the conflict between developed and developing countries in order
to achieve an international agreement on climate change. REDD+ offers an
opportunity for forest protection in developing countries and provides carbon
credits for developed counties. However, REDD+ is still under international
negotiation because its economic viability has not yet been thoroughly eval-
uated. This paper aims to elucidate the benefits of REDD+ and evaluate
the economic viability of REDD+ in Indonesia based on field survey data
and econometric analysis.
Indonesia is a candidate site for the implementation of REDD+ because
of its large amount of carbon stock and increasing deforestation. Forests in
Indonesia have been disappearing: forestland in Indonesia has decreased sub-
stantially, from 121 million hectares in 1990 to 100 million hectares in 2005
(Hansen et al., 2009), and the burning of forests has emitted huge amounts
of carbon over the last two decades. A key characteristic of forestland in
Indonesia is the thickness of peat. At least 55 Gt of carbon are stored in
Indonesian peatlands (Jaenickeet al., 2008). Indonesia accounted for 82% of
Southeast Asia’s carbon emissions from the decomposition of drained peat-
lands in 2006 (Hooijer et al., 2010). Deveny et al. (2009) assess the capacity
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for implementing REDD+ in each country using the Forest Carbon Index
(FCI). They give Indonesia a high evaluation along with Brazil, Russia, Peru,
Bolivia, and Colombia.
To design a workable REDD+ mechanism, the revenues from forest pro-
tection must be higher than the revenues sacrificed by refraining from de-
forestation. For example, conserving a forest might mean depriving local
farmers of the chance to earn money from agricultural development. This pa-
per examines this issue by estimating the break-even price of carbon (BEP)
that satisfies the minimum compensation for a forgone chance of develop-
ment. The result of the BEP estimation shows that REDD+ can provide
adequate compensation for Indonesian farmers based on the carbon price in
the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Peatland fire is another key issue for implementing REDD+ in Indone-
sia. Forestland in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia suffers from a high risk of
peatland fire. During a large-scale peatland fire in 1997, the total carbon
dioxide emission from Indonesia was estimated to be between 0.81 and 2.57
giga tons, which is equal to 13-40 percent of the mean annual global carbon
emissions from fossil fuels (Page et al., 2002). In 2008, the governments of
Indonesia and Australia jointly announced the KFCP (Kalimantan Forest
Carbon Partnership), one of the world’s first REDD+ pilot projects, to re-
duce the risk of peatland fire. In chapter 4 of this thesis, we consider how
REDD+ has been applied to peatland fire according to changes in farmer’s
decision making.
The main focus of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, we investigate the eco-
nomic potential of REDD+ based on field survey data. Forest conservation
requires compensation for the loss of other land use opportunities, such as
agricultural expansion. We estimate the BEP as the minimum carbon price
to achieve forest protection in Indonesia. Secondly, we investigate the factors
that promote peatland fire prevention. While peatland fire is an important
aspect of forest and climate policy, it has not been seriously addressed in eco-
nomic literatures. Thirdly, we evaluate the impact of the KFCP as a pilot
project of REDD+. Fourthly, we provide policy implications for REDD+ in
Indonesia that may be applicable to other tropical regions.
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the
concept and role of REDD+ as a policy for mitigating climate change. Chap-
8
ter 3 presents the results of our BEP estimation analysis. Chapter 4 discusses
the results of fire prevention analysis. Chapter 5 presents our conclusions,
posits goals for future research, and provides brief concluding remarks.
9
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Chapter 2
Role of REDD+ as a Policy of
Mitigating Climate Change
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the possibility of REDD+ with reviewing the key
features and challenges of REDD+ that have been discussed in international
negotiation. In the later part of this chapter, we focus on the key topics
for implementing in REDD+ in Central Kalimantan Province of Indonesia,
where the large area of peatland captures considerable amount of carbon.
Forests work as important carbon sink through the process of photosyn-
thesis. Deforestation and degradation of forest thus lead to release of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere. According to IPCC (2007), 1.6 giga tons of
carbon is emitted every year due to deforestation. This amounts to 20% of
global emissions of GHG (Greenhouse Gases) and is beyond the percentage
of emissions from transport sector. When we account the emissions from
forests, countries such as Indonesia, Brazil, and Malaysia, would be com-
parable to Russia, Japan, and Germany in terms of total amount of GHG
emissions (Myers Madeira 2008).
REDD+ is an attempt to reduce the emission of carbon dioxide due to
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. While attempts
for mitigating climate change has mainly focused on industrial emission,
enough attention has not been paid to emissions from forest sector. How-
ever, the role of forests play in carbon fixation and the speed of deforestation
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throughout the world warrant the necessity to advance the effort in forest
areas, especially in developing countries.
REDD+ can be regarded as one of the LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use
Change and Forestry) activities in developing countries. Article 3.3 and 3.4
of the Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries to account afforestation
activities in LULUCF since 1990 for compliance of the target in the proto-
col. After the COP7 (Conference of Parties of United Nations Conventions),
afforestation and reforestation in developing countries are validated as Clean
Development Mechanism project under the protocol. REDD+ differs from
these activities in its focus on prevention of degradation and deforestation in
developing countries.
Recent negotiation on climate mitigation has emphasized the potential
of REDD+. At COP11 held in Montreal in 2005, Papua New Guinea and
Costa Rica, on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), pro-
posed a mechanism to issue carbon credits for avoiding deforestation in de-
veloping countries. In response to this proposal, REDD+ has been addressed
in SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice) of the
UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change).
The Bali Action Plan adopted at COP13 in 2007, called for enhanced
national and international action including: “Policy approaches and positive
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sus-
tainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries”. After the Bali Action Plan, the concept of REDD has
been expanded to REDD+, taking into account the role of forest conserva-
tion, sustainable management, and forest carbon sink. In addition, COP13
required the relevant organizations and Parties to implement verification ac-
tivities for institution-building in the future. One example is Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility by the World Bank. In addition, discussion for financial
support was advanced as Norwegian government promised 1.8 billion euros
over five-year period. On the basis of the Bali Action Plan, the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) was estab-
lished in which the policy relating to REDD+ will be discussed. Currently,
the discussions on REDD+ is mainly addressed at AWG-LCA and SBSTA.
COP15 in 2009 confirmed the effectiveness of forest conservation for cli-
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mate change mitigation and the necessity of REDD+. The Copenhagen
accord that the Parties took note includes the following statement: “We
recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest
degradation and the need to enhance removals of GHG emission by forests
and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through
the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD+, to enable
the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries”. Although
this does not differ too much from the Bali Agreement, establishment of the
financial support from developed countries has advanced in COP15. In order
to promote mitigation and adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building
in developing countries, financial assistance with the goal of $30 billion from
2010 to 2013 and $100 billion per year until 2020 was included in the Copen-
hagen accord. In addition, Australia, France, Japan, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, announced jointly to offer $3.5 billion in
support of REDD+.
Through these international negotiations, REDD+ is becoming increas-
ingly important in global attempt to mitigate climate change. Many NGOs
and international organizations are working on pilot projects for REDD+.
However, there has not been agreement on what framework of REDD+ is
implemented, and what kind of incentive is offered under the framework.
One reason is that it is not easy to establish a system for careful measure-
ment, reporting, and verification (MRV) in developing countries. Another is
that it is not easy to reach a consensus on institutional arrangement that is
agreeable for every country.
This chapter investigates the possibility of REDD+ with reviewing the
cost analysis of REDD+ and analyze practical hurdles in its implementation
from the economic points of view.
2.2 Estimating Cost of REDD+
2.2.1 Definition of REDD+
Forest conservation can be the least expensive measures for climate change
mitigation (Nabuurs et al. 2007). Several studies so far has analyzed the
extent to which reduction of carbon emissions can be realized under various
13
carbon price (Osafo 2005; Osborne and Kiker 2005; Sathaye et al 2005; Silva-
Chavez 2005; Vera Diaz and Schwartzman 2005; Bellassen and Gitz 2008;
Grieg-Gran 2006, 2008; Kindermann et al 2006;. Sohngen and Beach 2006;
Kindermann et al. 2008;. Strassburg et al 2009). In this section, we overview
some results of these studies.
The basic functions of REDD+ is to offer developing countries an op-
portunity for financial support from developed countries in response to the
avoided amount of carbon emission through forest conservation. In exchange,
developed countries can acquire carbon credits which can be used for the com-
pliance of target of carbon emission. In this context, REDD+ might play a
role for reducing the conflict between north and south.
The financial institution that are currently under consideration can be
broadly divided into the fund mechanism and the market-based system (Parker
et al 2009; Isenberg and Potvin 2010). Under the market-based system, credit
is issued for emissions reductions by REDD+ and the developed countries
trade them in the carbon market. Under the fund-based scheme, money is
provided directly to developing countries.
Payments to developing countries is based on the difference between base-
line that define the amount of forest estimated from the trend of deforestation
in the past and the actual amount of forest. Setting of baseline can change
the amount of payment to the country so that it is not easy to reach a consen-
sus on the principle of baseline that every country can agree with. In order
to obtain more funding, there is an incentive to exaggerate the seriousness of
current deforestation. If there is a possibility that deforestation is suppressed
by decreasing future timber price, the use of current deforestation rate leads
to overestimation of the effect of REDD+. In this regard, baseline settings in
REDD+ has similar issue with additionality in CDM (Asuka and Takeuchi
2004).
In order for the mechanism of REDD+ to work, funds obtained by forest
conservation must be greater than the benefit that might be obtained by
development for commercial logging and agriculture. Thus, the size of the
opportunity cost is very important for the evaluation of REDD+. The op-
portunity cost can be estimated in two ways: bottom-up analysis and global
model analysis. In next subsection, we review the results from bottom-up
analysis that calculate the profits obtained from various land use change.
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2.2.2 Bottom-up analysis
In bottom-up analysis, the opportunity cost is evaluated by estimating ben-
efits that local residents can earn from transformation of forest into agricul-
ture, commercial logging, and cattle raising. The advantage of bottom-up
analysis is that it offers insight for appropriate institutional design by inves-
tigating motivation of local people for forest development. The drawback
of the analysis is that it lacks comprehensiveness and does not consider the
price change of agricultural products and forest products by land use change.
Table 2.1 summarizes the result of bottom up analysis. Estimated op-
portunity costs ranges from $0.15 to $30 per ton of carbon. Many of the
estimates are lower than the carbon price observed in the market. It suggest
that forest conservation is one of the cheapest measures for mitigating cli-
mate change. Vera Diaz and Schwartzman (2005) focus on deforestation in
Brazil. Emission of GHG from Brazil account for 2.5% of the world’s total
emissions and 75% of emission from Brazil is due to deforestation. Cattle
raising, soybean cultivation, and logging are major causes of deforestation.
Assuming that the cattle raising after harvesting timber, minimum amount
of compensation for avoiding deforestation, i.e. break-even price for carbon,
is estimated. The break-even price per hectare is estimated as $1,699 that is
composed of $1,435 for one-time logging and $264 for cattle raising after the
logging. Assuming 155 tons of carbon for carbon stock per hectare, $1,699
per hectare is equivalent to $11 per ton of carbon. If one uses $150 for logging
revenue, break-even price becomes $449 per hectare, $3 per ton of carbon.
15
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Osafo (2005) examines the effect of REDD+ in Ghana. Assuming that
logging and agricultural conversion are main cause of deforestation, the
break-even price is estimated by dividing the sum of logging revenue and
agricultural revenue by carbon emissions. The revenue from logging is es-
timated as $498 per hectare, and the present value of agricultural revenue
for cassava and maize is estimated as $1,278 per hectare at 10% discount
rate. When one assumes 60 tons of carbon per hectare, the break-even price
is estimated approximately $1,776 per hectare, equivalent to $30 per ton of
carbon. Using similar time scale and discount rate, Silva-Chavez (2005) es-
timates the break-even price in Bolivia at $886, equivalent to $4.43 per ton
of carbon.
Osborne and Kiker (2005) estimates the break-even price in the Republic
of Guyana. The revenue from large-scale timber production is considered
to be the opportunity cost of forest conservation. By avoiding the logging,
one can prevent emissions of 34.76 tons of carbon per hectare. When one
includes underground carbon, the estimate becomes 42.37 tons of carbon.
Minimum compensation for logging revenue thus becomes $0.18 per ton of
carbon at 15% discount rate and $0.71 per ton of carbon at 3% discount rate
when we consider only the above ground carbon. When underground carbon
is included, $0.15 per ton of carbon at 15% discount rate and $0.58 per ton
of carbon at 3% discount rate. These amounts are calculated by dividing the
discounted net present value of timber production revenue for 50 years by
the carbon emissions associated with the production.
As the discount rate assumed be higher, the present value of compensation
for avoiding deforestation be lower. It should be noted that the discount rate
here refers to the rate that is employed in the calculation by, say timber
production company. Including the underground carbon in estimation lower
the amount of compensation. This may seem odd, but one should note that
preventing more carbon emission at same hectare of land makes REDD+
cheaper.
Grieg-Gran (2008) is an update of Grieg-Gran (2006) that was carried
out for the Stern review (Stern 2007). Countries included for analysis are
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, In-
donesia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. The target is to halve the current
deforestation rate on the earth (13 million hectares per year). Opportunity
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costs for alternative land use in the eight countries are adopted from existing
research. The total cost becomes $4 billion or $8 billion, depending on the
inclusion of revenue from selective logging before slash-and-burn. When the
revenue from logging is excluded, 39% of the total cost is due to oil palm
plantation and 71% of the total cost is occurred in Brazil and Indonesia.
2.2.3 Global model analysis
In global model analysis, the impacts of REDD+ on the whole world are
evaluated with using simulation models. When considering the impact of
REDD+ on a global scale, it is necessary to take into account its impacts
on the agricultural market and timber markets.1 A number of studies using
the global model simulate the impacts of forest preservation over a period of
50 to 100 years. The amount of forest preservation depends mainly on the
carbon price. Forest preservation occurs in areas with lower opportunity cost
against other land use such as agriculture and logging.
Sathaye et al. (2005) estimate what the amount of preserved forest
land might be from 2000 to 2100 under various carbon price scenarios us-
ing GCOMP (Generalized Comprehensive Mitigation Assessment Process
Mode). They reveal that REDD+ can reduce carbon emissions from the
forest sector by 50.9 to 113.2 giga tons. With low opportunity costs and high
deforestation rates in Africa and South America, application of REDD+ can
contribute to decreases of carbon emission.
Sohngen and Beach (2006) evaluate the impact of REDD+ on forest con-
servation in the world with using GTM (Global Timber Model) developed
by Sohngen et al. (1999). GTM is a model that incorporates land use and
timber supply and demand, and maximizes the value of consumer surplus
against the cost of forest maintenance. The results of their simulation indi-
cate that the amount of reduced carbon is 1.6 giga tons per year at a price of
$100 per ton of carbon, and 0.1 giga tons per year at a price $5 per carbon
(Evaluated in 2000 U.S. dollars). Although significant amounts of carbon
emission can be reduced at a price of $100 per carbon, its total cost might
be $2,500 billion.
1For example, strict forest preservation in a certain area might increase the world wood
price assuming the demand is constant.
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Kindermann et al. (2006) used a simulation based on the land use model
to evaluate how subsidies and carbon tax affect forest preservation on a global
scale. Under the baseline scenario, 5% of the current forest area will be lost
and 17.5 giga tons of carbon will be released from 2006 to 2025. 500 million
hectares of forest area, which is one-eighth of the current forest area, will be
lost and 45 giga tons of carbon will be released in 100 years. With a subsidy
of $6 per ton of carbon every five years, deforestation decreases by half.
However,the cost will be $34 billion every year. A tax of $12 on swidden or
timber production can reduce deforestation by half also. Tax revenue would
be $6000 million per year in 2005, but decrease to $700 million in 2100 by
that time the deforestation rate will be low. The authors argued that a
combination of subsidy and tax scheme is appropriate.
Kindermann et al. (2008) compare the costs of forest conservation by
using GCOMP, GTM and DIMA (Dynamic Integrated Model of Forestry
and Alternative Land Use). The results show that REDD+ can reduce de-
forestation rate by 10% from 2005 to 2030 at cost of $400 million to $1700
million. The price of carbon per ton, to reduce deforestation rate by half,
is estimated to be $62.59 in GCOMP, $34.33 in GTM and $76.19 in DIMA.
This can reduce carbon emissions of 0.41-0.73 giga tons a year. However,
$17.2 billion $28 billion is required every year.
Strassburg et al. (2009) estimate the effects of REDD+ in developing
countries in top 20 in forest area by a combined incentives method. Combined
incentives is to combine the expected emissions and the historical emissions
based on the baseline. Required carbon price is estimated to be $29.63 to
reduce more than 90% deforestation. This can reduce 0.86-1.73 giga tons of
carbon emissions, however it total cost will be $30 billion per a year. The
result might be examined without the impact of forest conservation on timber
market, thus reported result shows a relatively low cost of forest conservation.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the results of global model simulations (Sathaye et
al., 2005; Sohngen and Beach 2006; Kindermann et al.. 2006; Kindermann
et al., 2008; Strassburg et al., 2009). It takes carbon emission reductions
of the year (giga tons of carbon) in the horizontal axis and annual cost ($1
billion) in the vertical axis.2 Figure 1 indicates that reducing 1 giga tons
of carbon emissions can be achieved with the cost at tens of billions of US
2The carbon prices are evaluated in 2005 US dollars
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Figure 2.1: Results of global model simulation
dollars a year. According to IPCC (2007), the amount of carbon emissions
from deforestation is estimated to be 1.6 giga tons per year on global.
2.3 Key challenges for implementing REDD+
2.3.1 Monitoring
Evaluating the amount of carbon stock in the forest is an important issue for
implementing in REDD+. Because, the net effect of REDD+ is evaluated
based on monitoring how REDD+ changes in carbon stock of forests. The
carbon emissions resulting from changes in land use are measured by three
stages of estimations. Firstly, creating forest inventory to record the state of
the forests existing. Secondly, recording of changes in the forest area based on
the field survey and remote sensing analysis. Thirdly, evaluating changes in
carbon amount contributed to change in land use (Houghton, 2003; Achard
et al., 2004; FAO, 2006; Mollicone et al., 2007).
According to Bellassen et al. (2008), data of forest area in each countries
that has been reported in the 1980’s by FAO is based on the prediction from
old studies or expert assessment. It is necessary to measure the up-to-date
of carbon sequestration accuracy with additional field survey and satellite
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analysis. Changes in forest area is measured by remote sensing and carbon
density is measured by the ground survey. However, conducting follow-up
research in the time series and large scale field investigation require high cost
(Matsumoto, 2010). It is important for monitoring the state of forest at low
cost to develop the technology, such as forest degradation evaluated with
satellite images in the future.
2.3.2 Baseline
Baseline can be defined by a prediction in the state of forest with no policy
interventions. The net effect of REDD+ would be evaluated by the deference
between the baseline and the actual state of forest. This is similar to the
baseline set in the CDM. Baseline can be set at a variety of scales; project
level, national level, and global level. Since the range is narrow, baseline
set at the project level is likely to lead to leakage. Baseline set at national
level is defined as the historical trend of deforestation in the country. Most
of having the largest scale is a baseline set at a global level. These baselines
are set with protracting the trend of deforestation rate from the past and
predicting deforestation rate in the future that is often evaluated by a model
with explanatory variables (such as population).
For developing countries, the definition of baseline is an important issue
that must be related to the direct revenue. According to FAO (2010) that is
survey and analysis announced every 5 or 10 years (Global Forest Resources
Assessment), forest area in Indonesia has become 94.43 billion hectares. It
means that predicted forest area in 2050 will become approximately 2.172
million hectares under the assumption of 9% deforestation rate a year or will
become approximately 1.396 million hectares under the assumption of 10%
deforestation rate a year. A percent change in assumption of deforestation
rate leads to the difference in prediction as much as 776,000 hectares forest
existence. If the carbon price per hectare of $2,000 is assumed, deference of
the revenue of $1.5 billion for Indonesia would be generated by the assump-
tion of the different baseline of 1%.
For countries that have already adopted the deforestation with some pol-
icy, the credit obtained by REDD+ would be small with setting baseline at
historical trend. In order to gain more credit, there is an incentive to de-
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clares more exaggerated deforestation rate in the future or present condition.
On the other hand, there is a concern in the provision side of credit. The
distributed credit is increased if the baseline set with rapid deforestation, the
provision of credit is reduced if the baseline set with slow deforestation. Fur-
thermore, the impact of REDD+ on carbon market become large if REDD+
provide large amount of credit. If funding scheme is assumed as market-
based, it is important to take into account the impact of setting the baseline
on the emissions trading market.
Mollicone et al. (2007) suggest that the countries that outweigh a base-
line on the deforestation rate of the global level can obtain credit based on
the baseline set at national trend, and countries that below a baseline on the
global level can obtain credit based on the diﬀerence between the baseline
on global level. As a result, it is possible for developing countries that de-
forestation rate is in top 20 to give incentives to not only the countries with
high deforestation rate but also countries with low deforestation rate.
Strassburg et al. (2009) examined the eﬀect of REDD+ by using the com-
bined incentive scheme. The characteristics of combined incentive scheme is
to combine the historical trend of emissions with expected global emissions in
estimating the baseline. The payments based on historical trend of emissions
I1 can be described as follows:
I1 = (HE Et) ∗ P, (2.3.1)
where HE is the trend of carbon emissions a year, Et is the carbon emissions
at year t, and P is the carbon price per ton. The payments based on expected
global emissions I2 can be described as follows:
I2 = (EE Et) ∗ P, (2.3.2)
where EE is the expected carbon emission on global a year. Then, payment
with combined incentives scheme can be described as follows:
CI = α ∗ I1 + (1 α) ∗ I2
= [α(HE) + (1 α)(EE) Et] ∗ P, (2.3.3)
where α is the weight which emphasize I1 or I2 (α L [0, 1]). If the α takes
1 or 0, incentive obtained from REDD+ is eliminated for some countries
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and the incentives to participate in REDD+ framework would be decreased,
leading to the possibility of leakage for some countries. The suggestion from
Mollicone et al. (2007) can be described that apply α = 0 for countries with
HE > EE and apply α = 1 for countries with HE < EE.
There is the uncertainty in baseline setting because baseline is intended
to predict the state of deforestation without REDD+ in the future. In this
regard, Schlamadinger et al. (2005) suggest that the baseline should have a
width in forest carbon stocks. For example, credit can be obtained between
upper or lower limit with a weight of constant reductions.
2.3.3 Leakage
Leakage is a challenge not only in a forest sector but also in a variety of
sectors on climate change mitigation. For example, when a cap become tight
in developed countries, iron and steel sector transfer to developing countries
where a cap is not so tight. The effect of emission reduction would be offset
throughout the world. A same concern can be happened in the forest sector.
REDD+ activities became popular in certain developing country, that had
been supplying timber to Japan, and forest conservation is advanced, how-
ever, deforestation might be occur in another developing countries. Because
timber demand from Japan would not be decreased and move into the an-
other developing countries. Then, the effect of emission reduction is canceled
from as total perspective. As long as the all forest would be under the same
REDD+ scheme, the problem of leakage can occur.
By increasing the number of countries participating in REDD+, the pos-
sibility of leakage entire world can be reduced. This is why it is important to
agree with institutional decisions of REDD+ by all countries. According to
Strassburg et al. (2009), using the combined incentive scheme can encourage
most countries to participate in REDD+ scheme.
2.3.4 Impermanence
Whether the emission reduction from REDD+ can be defined as permanently
or not is called the problem of the non-persistent (Ellis 2001). There is a
possibility that a certain forest, that is preserved in a certain period, would
be harvested in the next period. In addition, the forest is suffer from some
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natural factors, such as a fire or disaster that destroy the forest, as well
as artifact. The Reserve Accounting, The Ton-Year Accounting and The
Expiring Credits are suggested to be coping with the problem of the non-
persistent.
The Reserve Accounting is employed by Voluntary Carbon Standard,
Carbon-Fix and Greenhouse Friendly (Bellassen 2008). In Reserve Account-
ing approach, reserving a portion of the credit that was produced by de-
forestation reduction and deposit and compensate with the same amount of
credit if the forest is destroyed due to failure the project or policy or natural
factors. This approach is similar to the insurance, and the credit can be
handle a permanent credit.
The Ton-Year Accounting is an approach to consider the credit as per-
manently reduction, if the carbon fixed in the forest over a certain period
(Moura-Costa and Wilson 2000). Released carbon into the atmosphere will
be absorbed by biosphere and oceans over time. Thus, the period is con-
sidered as equivalence factor. If the forest absorb carbon in the period, it is
considered as permanent reductions. However, there is uncertainty in natural
scientific to estimate the equivalent period, so far the estimations reported
that equivalence period is range from 42 to 150 years (Marland et al. 2001).
The Expiring Credits is an approach to issue a valid credit with the dead-
line (Mare´chaland Hecq 2006). The credit become invalid after expired, it
is necessary for extended using credit to obtain a new limited credit or ob-
tain the permanent credit. In fact, for afforestation and reforestation in the
CDM, temporary Certified Emission Reduction tCER and long-term Certi-
fied Emission Reduction: lCER are established.
2.3.5 Funding mechanism
As a way to fund a REDD+, two mechanisms are considered that the mar-
ket based and the foundation based (Parker et al 2009; Isenberg and Potvin
2010). In the market based mechanism, the credit are traded through the
market, and price is determined by relationship between supply and demand.
Credit are able to use in developed countries to achieve the reduction target
of the country. This mechanism is to be considered as an effective mecha-
nism in the implementing forest conservation, however, the invest is affected
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by the changing in price. Large amount of credit provision from REDD+
might decrease the investment for emission reduction on other industry sec-
tors (Bosetti et al. 2009).
NGOs such as Greenpeace and CCAP (Center for Clean Air Policy) sug-
gest that dual market system to create a trading market for REDD+ sepa-
rately from the conventional carbon markets (Ogonowski et al. 2007). Under
the dual market system, credits produced by REDD+ is not tradable in nor-
mal carbon markets. However, developed countries can use the credit in the
realization of the reduction target. It is also possible to link the two markets
after REDD+ mechanism has been matured.
The foundation based scheme is to establish a fund at the international
level or national level to promote voluntary fund provision. A fund of $1 bil-
lion that the Norwegian government has reached an agreement with the In-
donesian government in May 2010 is an example of foundation based scheme.
Foundation based scheme can avoid the instability of the carbon price, how-
ever, the support would be stops if fond is exhaustive.
As a one of the other issues than the above, there is a problem of allo-
cation of funds in the developing countries. That because of the hurdle of
national sovereignty, REDD+ is not able to determine how fond would be
distributed in the developing country. However, incentives from REDD+ do
not work well, if funds would be reach the decision makers who determine the
deforestation (Strassburg et al. 2009). CCBA (The Climate, Community,
and Biodiversity Alliance) that is a third-party certifier of GHG reduction
project was based upon that more than 50% of poor households receive profit
from project (CCBA, 2008) In addition, there is a possibility that implement-
ing in REDD+ excludes local people who depend their livelihood on forest
from using forest. With respect to these aspects, it is necessary to pay enough
attention.
As an another issue than the design of REDD+, there is problem ac-
ceptance capacity of the host countries. Forest Carbon Partnership Fund
of the World Bank and the Amazon Fund in Brazil have been supporting
to improve the acceptance capacity; Creating scenarios for deforestation and
forest degradation and land use change, constructing the effective monitoring
system, and promoting indigenous peoples to participation in projects.
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2.4 Key topics in REDD+ in Indonesia
Forest area in Indonesia has been decreased from 121 million hectares in
1990 to 100 million hectares in 2005 (Hansen et al. 2009). About 75%
of deforestation in Indonesia has been occurred in Kalimantan island and
Sumatra island. The average rate of deforestation in Indonesia during 2000
to 2005 was 710,000 hectares per year. This is rather modest than 1.78
million hectares per year between 1990 to 2000, although still high.
Indonesia has significant potential as target areas for REDD+. Deveny et
al. (2009) uses the index of FCI (Forest Carbon Index) to assess the capac-
ity for implementation of REDD+ in each country. FCI evaluate the ability
of countries to obtain carbon credit at low cost, considering the situation
of economy and forest, the governance capacity and implementability. Al-
though there is some problems with respect to its governance capacity and
implementability, FCI gives a high evaluation to Indonesia, as sixth in the
world after Brazil, Russia, Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.
Estimating the cost of forest conservation in Central Kalimantan is one
of the important challenge to evaluate the workability of REDD+. Because,
characteristic of the forests in Central Kalimantan is that they grow on peat-
land that contains a lot of carbon. It means that forest conservation in this
area has high importance from the viewpoint of carbon fixation. Jaenicke et
al. (2008) estimate that there are at least 55 giga tons of carbon in Indonesian
peatland. Carbon in peatland can be released into the atomosphere by de-
forestation, degradation of land, and forest fire. Peatland forest in Southeast
Asia has been decreased rapidly in the last decades by these factors (Hooijer
et al. 2010). In chapter 3 of this thesis, the cost of forest conservation in
Central Kalimantan is estimated with BEP estimations.
Another challenge is how promote peatland fire prevention. By the large
scale fire that occurred in 1997, land area of 790,000 hectares in Central
Kalimantan province was damaged and additional 0.24 to 0.28 giga tons of
carbon were released into atmosphere (Page et al. 2002). When we extrap-
olate this to entire Indonesia, 0.81 to 2.57 giga tons of carbon were released
in a year. This is equivalent to 13 - 40% of the emissions from the fossil
fuel sector. In chapter 4 of this thesis, the factors promoting individual fire
prevention is investigated.
26
The findings of this thesis provide policy implications with respect to
forest conservation in Indonesia. Providing incentives for local households
to protect forest would enhance appropriate forest management. However,
the result of this thesis suggest that effective policy design should take into
account not only the enforcement of economic instruments but also the role
of non-economic factors such as mutual aid activity in local community. The
policy supporting totally activities of villagers can contribute to reduce the
risk of deforestation in Central Kalimantan.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigate the possibility of REDD+. In COP18 held
at Doha, Qatar in December 2012, it is decided to extend Kyoto Protocol
until 2020 and to create new international framework after 2020. Currently,
two line of proposals are juxtaposed: to involve major emitting developing
countries such as China and India to participate, or to require only developed
countries to owe emission reduction target. REDD+ with fund mechanism
plays a significant role, in order to reduce the conflict between developed
and developing countries. While there are a lot of issues to be resolved for
workable institutional design, REDD+ is expected to be potentially beneficial
for mitigating global climate change as well as developing countries.
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Chapter 3
Estimating the break-even
price for forest protection in
Central Kalimantan
3.1 Introduction
This chapter estimates the break-even price in Central Kalimantan province,
Indonesia and evaluates the effectiveness of a REDD+ mechanism in this
area. On the basis of data collected through a field survey, we found that
the break-even price is $15.45 per ton of carbon or $4.21 per ton of carbon
dioxide. The figure can be even lower when we take the peat thickness of the
area into account. Our analysis shows that the current level of carbon price
can provide adequate compensation for Indonesian farmers.
The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation plus (REDD+)
mechanism has been one of the central issues to an international discussion of
Post-Kyoto Agreement. Tropical deforestation and forest degradation con-
tribute to 1.6 Gt, or 20% of worldwide carbon emissions into the atmosphere
every year (IPCC 2007). Forests play a significant role in global carbon se-
questration (Akao 2011). Forest protection, therefore, should be considered
a critical part of the solution to climate change.
Indonesia can supply as much as 11.8% of the world’s carbon credit
through REDD+ (Deveny et al. 2009). Forests in Indonesia have rapidly
been disappearing and have emitted huge amounts of carbon over the last
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two decades: forestland has decreased substantially from 121 million hectares
in 1990 to 100 million hectares in 2005 (Hansen et al. 2009). A key charac-
teristic of forestland in Indonesia is in its peat thickness. At least 55 Gt of
carbon are stored in Indonesian peatlands (Jaenicke et al. 2008). Indonesia
accounted for 82% of the carbon emissions from decomposition of drained
peatlands in Southeast Asia in 2006 (Hooijer et al. 2010). For these reasons
Indonesia is an important place for a REDD+ mechanism.
REDD+ provides rewards for forest protection. Still, while it would make
a significant contribution to mitigating climate change, it can cause the loss
of a chance for regional economic development: local farmers, for example
would lose the opportunity to profit from additional agricultural activity.
To design a workable REDD+ mechanism, revenues from forest protections
must be higher than the revenues sacrificed by refraining from deforestation.
The right compensation for protecting a given forest depends on the carbon
fixation achieved in the area and would not be higher than the carbon price
in a global market like the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). We
define the break-even price of carbon (BEP) as a carbon price satisfying
the minimum needed to compensate for a forgone chance of development.
This thesis estimates the BEP in Central Kalimantan province, Indonesia,
and evaluates the effectiveness of a REDD+ mechanism in this area. Our
analysis shows that the current level of carbon price can provide the necessary
compensation to Indonesian farmers.
There have been many attempts to estimate the BEP needed to protect
forestland in various countries. One of the earliest studies, by Osborne &
Kiker (2005), estimated the BEP in Guyana to be $0.71 per ton of carbon.
They considered that logging was the only factor for deforestation in that
area. Bellassen and Gitz (2008), estimated the BEP in Cameroon, focused
on the role of shifting cultivation in deforestation and estimated the BEP
to be $10.44 per ton of carbon. Wang and Lu (2010) found that carbon
offset project has feasibility in Yunnan Province, China with the carbon
price at $14 per ton. Studying Indonesia, Butler et al. (2009) estimated
the BEP in regard to oil palm plantation to be $3, 835-$9, 630 per hectare.
Large-scale oil palm plantation has been a significant factor in deforestation,
contributing 20 % of deforestation in Indonesia (Grieg-Gran 2008). While
large-scale oil palm plantation will continue to be one of the potential factor
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for future deforestation, the threat has been decreased as a result of a two-
year moratorium agreement on forest and peatland concessions between the
Indonesian and Norwegian governments signed on 20 May 2011. According
to the agreement, Indonesia will take systematic and decisive action to reduce
its forest and peat related emissions of GHG, whereas Norway will support
those efforts by making available up to one billion US dollars exclusively on
a payment-for-results basis (Caldecott et al. 2011). The BEP for Indonesia
in regard to small-scale agriculture is summarized in Grieg-Gran (2008), but
the figure given in this study is based on the relatively old data given in
Tomich et al. (1998).
The contribution of our study is twofold. First, we focus on the Indone-
sian forestlands, which have a potentially large impact on carbon emissions;
successful implementation of REDD+ in this area would be important in
a global climate policy. Second, we estimate the BEP in regard to small-
scale agricultural activity based on original field research: information on
the net revenue from rice and rubber cultivation collected by a field survey
in three villages in Pulang Pisau Regency in Central Kalimantan Province,
helps to calculate an up-to-date and adequate compensation for protecting
the forestland in this area.
3.2 Compensated Reduction and the Break-
Even Price
Compensated Reduction is one of REDD+ mechanisms currently discussed
in the UNFCCC negotiations (Bellassen and Gitz 2008). Under this mech-
anisms, developing countries that voluntarily reduce their national carbon
emissions from deforestation would be authorized to sell carbon credit using
their historical rate of deforestation as a baseline. It assigns monetary value
to carbon stored in standing trees and soil, thereby providing a financial
incentive for forest protection to stakeholders. Funds for Compensated Re-
duction would be supplied from the global carbon market or from developed
countries.
The actual amount of reduced deforestation in a developing country
should be measured by comparing the realized deforestation rate with a base-
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line deforestation rate. Once a developing country receives carbon credits and
sells them on the global market, it must commit not to increase its deforesta-
tion rate. Consequently, emission reduction must be measured and verified
continuously during the commitment period. Although Compensated Re-
duction assigns a value to a tropical forest with carbon dioxide fixation, it
does not take into account the total value of a tropical forest in the ecosys-
tem, which includes maintaining biodiversity, supporting the local climate,
and providing elements of local livelihood such as agricultural and pharma-
ceutical products. A viable REDD+ mechanism should also pay attention to
the right of forest dwellers (Couto Pereira 2010). Since it provides financial
aid for forest conservation to local community or stakeholders, REDD+ is
expected to play a role of poverty reduction.
At what carbon price would conservation compete with agricultural de-
velopment? To answer this question, it is necessary to calculate the BEP
as the price of carbon at which conserving forests become financially attrac-
tive for farmers. In case of Central Kalimantan, we consider rice and rubber
production as a driving force of deforestation. Once compensation according
to BEP paid, forest protection would provide revenue to farmers at least as
much as profitable from rice and rubber production. We define the BEP as
a minimum price that farmer receive in order to make carbon fixation more
attractive than rice and rubber production.
3.3 Field survey
To collect information on the net revenue from rice and rubber cultivation, we
conducted a field survey in three villages in Pulang Pisau Regency, Central
Kalimantan, in June 2010. We visited 189 randomly chosen households living
in Bawan Village, Garantung Village and Maliku Village. The response rate
was 71%, thus we have 134 samples for analysis.
Bawan Village is located the in northern part of Pulang Pisau Regency,
where the Dayak tribe has traditionally lived. Maliku Village and Garantung
village are located in the southern part of the regency. Many people living in
Garantung Village came from Java during the Mega Rice Project in the 1990s
that was planned to turn one million hectares of unproductive peat swamp
forest into rice paddies but finally failed. Table 3.1 summarizes the number
35
of samples of our field survey. “Target” households means the number of
households in the area targeted for random sampling in the village. The
number of target household for sampling is smaller than the total number
of household in the area. This is because that including all households for
random sampling is inefficient and time consuming to implement face-to-face
interview especially in the sparsely populated villages. Therefore, we selected
a geographical area where many farmers dwell as a target area for random
sampling. Since the population of Maliku village is widely spread out over
a large area, the number of households targeted in the village was set lower
than in the other two villages.
We asked households how much rubber and rice they harvested in the pre-
vious year. On average, the amount of rice harvest per hectare was 1,071.5kg
and the rubber harvest per hectare was 2,336.1kg (see Table 3.2). It should be
noted that households in our analysis might have relatively lower productivity
of rice production, since average productivity in Central Kalimantan in 2010
is 2,627kg/ha according to the Statistics Indonesia (http://dds.bps.go.id/).
There is considerable variation in the average rubber harvest among the three
villages: 780kg for Garantung, 1,170kg for Maliku, and 2,344.9kg for Bawan.
The difference would be due to the fact that rubber trees in Garantung and
Maliku are still young and not yet ready for tapping. Many farmers in these
two villages started to plant rubber trees only in recent year. As the trees
continue to grow, the income of farmers will increase. We also asked the
number of labor force and labor hours for planting and harvesting the rice
and for harvesting the rubber. From this information, we estimated the net
revenue from rice and rubber cultivation per hectare.
Table 3.1: Details of field survey
Population Households Target Visited Responded
Bawan 829 211 148 79 54
Garantung 2,916 790 458 63 44
Maliku 3,424 918 79 47 36
Total 7,169 1,919 685 189 134
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Table 3.2: Average harvest per hectare
Average rice harvest (kg) Average rubber harvest (kg)
Bawan 660 2,344.9
Garantung 1,085.3 780
Maliku 1,060.2 1,170
Total 1,071.5 2,336.1
3.4 Empirical analysis
In Central Kalimantan, rice and rubber cultivation have been two of the
main causes of deforestation. According to Grieg-Gran (2008), these activ-
ities have accounted for 49% of deforestation, with oil palm plantation and
cassava cultivation accounting for the rest (32% and 19%, respectively). This
thesis assumes that rice and rubber cultivation are sole factors of deforesta-
tion in this area. Although oil palm plantation can be another major factor
of deforestation, we omit this possibility because of the moratorium agree-
ment between the Indonesian and Norwegian governments. We calculate the
economic revenue from deforestation as the Net Present Value (NPV) of agri-
culture over a commitment period discounted at the rate of 10%. To obtain
the BEP, the total NPV is divided by the total carbon density of a hectare
of forestland.
The average agricultural revenue per hectare (R) is obtained by using the
following formula (Bellasen and Gitz 2008):
R = V1 + θ
T∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
∗ Vs + (1 θ)
T∑
t=k
(
1
1 + r
)t
∗ Vg, (3.4.1)
where T is the commitment period of forest protection, V1 is the one-time net
revenue from logging per hectare, Vs is the net revenue from rice cultivation
per hectare, Vg is the net revenue from rubber cultivation per hectare, θ L
[0, 1] is the ratio of rice cultivation per hectare of expanding agricultural
land, and r is the discount rate. We assume k = 11: the revenue from
rubber production is generated after 11 years.
The net revenue from rice cultivation per hectare (Vs) is obtained by the
following formula:
Vs =
∑
i (Ysi ∗ Ps Lsi)∑
iMsi
, (3.4.2)
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where Ysi is the yield of rice by the farmer i, Ps is the price of rice, Lsi is
the labor costs for rice production at the land of the farmer i, and Msi is the
total agricultural land for rice production used by the farmer i.
The net revenue from rubber cultivation per hectare (Vg) is obtained by
the following formula:
Vg =
∑
j (Ygj ∗ Pg Lgj)∑
j Mgj
, (3.4.3)
where Ygj is the yield of rubber by the farmer j, Pg is the price of rubber,
Lgj is the labor costs for rubber production at the land of the farmer j, and
Mgj is the total agricultural land for rubber production used by the farmer
j.
The net revenue from agricultural land is the diﬀerence between the value
of output (Y ∗ P ) and the cost of labor force (L). The labor costs for rice
production, the amount that a farmer could earn from an alternative job, is
obtained by the following formula:
Lsi = W ∗ (Nsi ∗ Hsi +Nti ∗ Hti +Nhsi ∗ Hhsi) , (3.4.4)
where W is the minimum wage in Central Kalimantan province, Nsi and Hsi
are the number of labor force and the labor hours for planting rice, Nti and
Hti are those for tending rice, Nhsi and Hhsi are those for harvesting rice.
We use data of our ﬁeld survey and Tomich et al. (1998) for the number of
labor force and labor hours.
The labor costs for rubber production can be represented by the following
formula:
Lgj = W ∗ (Nhgj ∗ Hhgj) , (3.4.5)
where W is the minimum wage in Central Kalimantan, Nhgj is the number
of labor force and Hhgj is the labor hours for harvesting rubber. Please
note that the minimum wage can be considered as an opportunity cost of
agricultural labor input. When agricultural proﬁt is higher than this cost,
the farmer will decide to develop and cultivate his own land. Therefore, our
procedure to estimate the BEP is valid to the case that the decision maker
is a farmer who owns his/her land as well as that it is a landowner. The
opportunity cost would be zero if he/she cannot ﬁnd any alternative job in
the labor market.
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The revenue from the forest protection per hectare (Rf ) is obtained by
multiplying the carbon density (C) by the carbon price (Pc).
Rf = C ∗ Pc. (3.4.6)
To achieve forest protection, the revenue from that, Rf , should outweigh the
revenue from developing the forest, R, that is deﬁned as equation (3.41).
Rf ⇔R (3.4.7)
We deﬁne P ∗c as the minimum carbon price that satisfy the above equation.
Pc
∗ =
R
C
(3.4.8)
We call P ∗c as the Break Even Price (BEP) that should be paid to attain the
forest protection.
3.5 Result
The parameters used to estimate the BEP is provided in Table 3.3. We
assume that, on average, two-ﬁfth of one hectare of additional agricultural
expansion is devoted to rice cultivation and three-ﬁfth of that to rubber
tree cultivation. This is adopted from Grieg-Gran (2008) that estimates the
contribution of rice production and rubber production to deforestation in
Indonesia as 19% and 30%. We use the ratio between two values (2/5) as
the share of rice production. The period committed to forest preservation is
30 years.
The estimated average revenue from rice and rubber production over 30
years is $3,477 per hectare. We used the producer price of rice and rubber in
Indonesia in 2008 as reported by FAO (2010), and estimated what it would be
in 2010 by applying the inﬂation rate. We used 225 tons per hectare as carbon
density in Indonesia. This ﬁgure is calculated by 350 ≥0.47 ≥1.37 = 225,
where 350 is a ton of above-ground biomass for tropical moist forests in
insular Asia, 0.47 is the carbon fraction of above-ground biomass (tropical
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and subtropical), and 1.37 is the conversion rate from above-ground to total
biomass in a tropical rainforest (IPCC 2006).
Table 3.3: Parameters used in analysis
Parameter Estimate used in models
r Discount rate 10%
θ Share of rice production per hectare 2/5
T Commitment period of forest protection 30 years
Ps Price of rice $0.32/kg
Pg Price of rubber $0.87/kg
W Minimum wage $0.68/hour
C Carbon density 225t/ha
Estimation results are shown in Table 3.4. The BEP is estimated to be
as large as $15.45 per ton of carbon or $4.21 per ton of carbon dioxide. The
average carbon price of EU ETS in 2009 is $46.48 per ton of carbon or $12.7
per ton of carbon dioxide (World Bank 2010). Therefore, carbon revenue
clearly outweighs agricultural revenue in Central Kalimantan.
Table 3.4: Estimation result of BEP
Parameter Result
Rice net revenue per hectare(Vs) $ 60.1
NPV of rice production per hectare $ 600.8
Rubber net revenue per hectare (Vg) $ 1,643.2
NPV of rubber production per hectare $ 5,393.7
Average agricultural revenue per hectare (R) $ 3,476.5
BEP of carbon (Pc
∗) $ 15.45
BEP of CO2 $ 4.21
We extend the analysis and estimate total compensation across Central
Kalimantan Province. The amount of compensation payment is determined
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by realized deforestation rate (with REDD+ policy) in comparison with ex-
pected deforestation rate (without REDD+ policy). According to the In-
donesian Ministry of Forestry, the forest area in Central Kalimantan Province
had been reduced from 9.48 million hectares in 2002 to 8.9 million hectares
in 2003. We therefore assume that the deforestation rate is approximately
6 percent a year. At this rate, the size of the forest area would be 5.75
million hectares in 2010 and 0.88 million hectares in 2040. If Central Kali-
mantan Province successfully prevents the deforestation after 2010, the forest
area maintained would be 5.75 million hectares in 2040. Thus, the size of
protected forest would be 4.87 million hectares (5.75 hectares minus 0.88
hectares). Multiplying the estimated BEP per hectare by figure 3.1, the
compensation payment to Central Kalimantan Province amounts to $16.9
billion.
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Figure 3.1: Effect of REDD+ policy in Central Kalimantan
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
The analysis in the above section does not take into account several uncer-
tainties in the parameters. Since there can be considerable variation in these
parameters, it is important to examine how the amount of compensation
should change if we assume different parameters. In this section, we con-
duct a sensitivity analysis for key parameters in estimating compensation
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payments. We ﬁnd that several parameters have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
BEP (Table 3.5). For example, 2 % increase in the discount rate leads to 65
% decrease in the BEP and 100 % increase in the rubber price leads to 121
% increase in the BEP. If we assume that it is very diﬃcult for a farmer to
ﬁnd an alternative job and the opportunity cost of labor is zero, the BEP
increase as much as 58.9%. On the other hand, changing assumption on the
costs other than labor does not change the result signiﬁcantly. Farmers in
this area were using simple and inexpensive equipments to produce rice and
rubber, therefore we implemented a sensitivity analysis with the assumption
that the cost of other inputs is as much as 10 % of the labor cost.
The amount of compensation is determined by comparing the realized
deforestation rate with the baseline scenario. In the previous section, the
deforestation rate of Central Kalimantan is assumed to be 6% a year. De-
pending on the expected deforestation rate, the amount of compensation
would be greater or smaller.
Furthermore, identifying carbon contents in crops would also lead to an
increase in the NPV of crops. Palm (1999) reported that natural rubber
contains 89.2 ton of carbon per hectare. To take carbon in rubber into
account, the NPV of rubber should be added by the amount that the 89.2
ton of carbon times the carbon price. If we assume the carbon price is $
15.45, the NPV of rubber would be $1,382.6 (=89.2 ∗ 15.45). Multiplying
this ﬁgure with the share of rubber production (3/5) and adding to the
average agricultural revenue per hectare ($3,476.5) in Table 3.4, BEP would
become $ 4,306 (= $3,476.5 + $829.5) per hectare. Although taking into
account the carbon in crops is important for realizing carbon ﬁxation, it may
foster monoculture plantation and make conservation of natural forest areas
more diﬃcult.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Carbon density
Osafo (2005) estimated the BEP for Ghana and found a higher amount than
our analysis ($29.59 per ton of carbon). Silva-Cha´vez (2005) found a smaller
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Table 3.5: Results of the sensitivity analysis
Parameter Initial value Change in value Change in BEP
Discount rate (r) 10% +2% -65%
Share of rice production (θ) 2/5 2/5 +55%
Carbon density (C) 225 +75 -25%
Value of logging (Vl) 0 +$ 830 +24%
Price of rice (Ps) $ 0.32 +100% +38%
Price of rubber (Pg) $ 0.92 +100% +121%
Costs other than labor 0 +0.1* Lsi -3%
Opportunity cost of labor (W ) $0.68/hour -100% +58.9%
BEP of $4.43 per ton of carbon for Bolivia. One of the reasons different
estimates of a BEP are generated is the assumption made in regard to carbon
density. For example, Osafo (2005) used 60 tons of carbon density and Silva-
Cha´vez (2005) used 200 tons of carbon density for the area, while we use
225 tons of carbon per hectare. These difference in carbon density can be
attributed to vegetation and soil condition of each area. Estimation in Osafo
(2005) reflects the fact that deforestation is spreading in degraded forest and
this leads to the relativity lower density assumed in the analysis. Another
major reason for difference in BEP is the assumed activity that drive land-use
change. Silva-Cha´vez (2005) assumes soybean planting while Osafo (2005)
assumes maize, cassava planting and tree logging as major drivers of land-use
change. Furthermore, if we were to take oil palm plantation into account,
the NPV of land development would increase. Butler et al. (2009) estimated
that the NPV of oil palm agriculture in Indonesia is between $3, 835 and
$9, 630 per hectare.
The estimated BEP might be drastically cheaper if we consider the peat
thickness of Central Kalimantan. The below-ground biomass used in our
model is based on IPCC (2006). However, this underestimates the amount
of below-ground biomass in this area. For example, Jaenicke et al. (2008)
reported that carbon storage in 734,700 hectare of Sebangau peat domes in
Central Kalimantan is 2.3G ton of carbon. If we simply divide the former
figure by the latter, we have 3,130 tons of carbon per hectare. This carbon
density is more than ten times higher than the figure we assumed in our
analysis.
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3.7.2 Indirect effect of the rubber price
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Figure 3.2: Number of households commencing rubber tree planting
Table 3.6: Number of households by condition of rubber trees
Holding Still young Ready for harvest Failed, etc
Bawan 47 18 21 8
Garantung 32 28 1 3
Maliku 18 15 2 1
Total 97 61 24 12
In our field survey, we found that 46 out of 51 farmers planted rubber
trees after 2005 (Figure 3.2). Because of this, a relatively large number of
households in Garantung and Maliku have rubber trees that are still young
and not yet ready for tapping (Table 3.6). Since the international rubber
price has been increasing recently, this might affect the crop choice of farmers.
An increase in rubber planting means increase in the NPV of agricultural
development in this area. We must take the change in farmers’ behavior into
account when designing a workable implementation of REDD+.
Throughout the former section, we assumed that the share of rubber pro-
duction is fixed at 3/5. However, the share can be changed by the number of
farmers who start the rubber cultivation responding to the increase of rubber
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price. To consider the impact of this behavioral change, we regress the num-
ber of farmers who start planting rubber on various factors that potentially
affect it including the price of rubber. Estimated model is represented as
follows;
St = αt + βP
r
t + γP
q
t + δFt + ηY ear + ϵt, (3.7.1)
where St denotes the number of farmers who start planting rubber in year t,
P rt and P
q
t denotes the price of rubber and rice in year t and Y ear captures
a time trend. Since widespread fires are frequent in this area and this might
inhibit planting multiyear crops, the experience of fire damages in year t,
Ft, is also included in the model. α, β, γ, δ, and η are parameters to be
estimated and ϵ is the error term. The information when farmers started
planting rubber tree and when they experienced fire damage are collected
through our field survey discussed in Section 3.3. The historical data of the
price of rubber and rice are taken from the FAO statistics and adjusted to
2007 price by using the average consumer price index. The data period is
from 1991 to 2010.
Estimation result by OLS is summarized in Table 3.7. The coefficient of
the rubber price is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the
higher rubber price is associated with the higher number of farmers starting
the rubber production. To be more precise, one dollar increase in the rubber
price can result in 8 farmers to start the rubber production.
By using this information, we can extend the sensitivity analysis to in-
clude the indirect effect of the rubber price. Analysis in the previous section
revealed that the 100 % increase in the rubber price could result in the in-
crease of BEP as large as 121 % on the assumption that the share of rubber
production was 3/5. The BEP will be further increased, when we consider
the indirect effect of the rubber price through the change in the share of rub-
ber production. We firstly multiply 8.02 (the coefficient of the rubber price
in Table 3.7) with 0.92 (100 % increase in the rubber price) and obtain 7.38
as the increase in the numbers of farmers that start planting rubber. Then
we divide 7.38 by 134 (the number of sample in the regression analysis) and
obtain 5.5 % as the increase of farmers in percentage. Next, by adding 5.5
% to 60 % (=3/5), we have 65.5 % as a newly assumed share of the rubber
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production. Using this new assumption, the increase of BEP with 100 %
increase in the rubber price becomes 140 %. This is 19 % point higher than
the sensitivity analysis on the rubber price in the previous section that omit
the indirect eﬀect of changing share of rubber production.
Table 3.7: Decision to start planting the rubber trees
Independent variable Coeﬃcient (Standard Error)
rubber price
8.028∗∗
(0.386)
rice price
7.71
(9.116)
ﬁre damage
0.266∗
(0.149)
year
0.792∗∗∗
(0.252)
Adjusted R2 0.683
The number of sample 19
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.55
≥≥≥, ≥≥, ≥=statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. We used a Breusch-
Godfrey LM test and could not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
3.7.3 Oil palm expansion
Oil palm expansion-based industries are an another emerging threat of defor-
estation in Central Kalimantan, and a more serious one than small household
agricultural expanding in Central Kalimantan. Oil palm expansion has been
suppressed by an agreement signed by Indonesia and Norway. In 2011, the
governments of Indonesia and Norway formed an alliance, agreeing to a two-
year moratorium on the clearing of additional forest for oil palm plantation.
This agreement, however, expired in 2013, and forestland in Indonesia now
faces the risk of deforestation given the strong economic incentive of oil palm
plantation. It may be diﬃcult to implement a carbon payment policy for
this highly productive crop because the cost of forest protection is high. We
must estimate this new situation in Indonesia.
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The above analysis does not consider the opportunity cost of oil palm
plantation. When we include the revenue from oil palm development, the
BEP becomes much higher than the price of the carbon credit. With high
productivity and the creation of employment in rural communities, oil palm
plantation has played a signiﬁcant role in Indonesian economic growth and
poverty mitigation of small households in previous decades (Susila 2004).
Indonesia has increased the production of palm oil in response to increased
demand: world crude palm oil production has increased 460 percent, from
4.5 million tons in 1980 to 20.9 tons in 2000 (Koh and Wilcove, 2007; Rist,
2010). Large scale-oil palm plantation implementation by oil palm companies
yields large proﬁts and contributes to changes in land use and land cover:
agricultural land for oil palms has increased from 3.6 million hectares in 1961
to 8.1 million hectares in 2009 (Grieg-Gran, 2008; Donald, 2004).
To evaluate the impact of oil palm expansion on the changing cost of
forest protection, we rewrite our BEP estimation model as follows:
Rh =
T∑
t=j
(
1
1 + r
)t
∗ Vh, (3.7.2)
where Rh is the average agricultural revenue of palm oil per hectare over 30
years and Vh is the net revenue from palm oil plantation per hectare. We
assume j = 7: the oil palm can be harvested after seven years. The other
parameters has been adopted from the above estimation.
According to Grieg-Gran (2008), large scale oil palm plantation accounts
for 20 percent of deforestation and yields $3,340 per hectare in net rev-
enue in Indonesia. We omit the small-scale oil palm cultivation implemented
by small households because it accounts for only 6% of deforestation. Oil
palms require adequate knowledge and investment to be properly cultivated
in terms of fertilizer use, water management, planting in appropriate areas,
and observance of the law. Small households often lack of these capabilities.
The results of our estimation described in Table 3.8 indicate that in terms
of NPV, oil palm cultivation has a higher productivity ($16,334.26) than rice
($600.8) and rubber ($5,393.7) cultivation, indicating that oil palm planta-
tion is an attractive and proﬁtable use of land for developers or stakeholders.
47
Table 3.8: BEP estimation with oil palm plantation
Parameter Result
Oil palm net revenue per hectare (Vh) $ 3,340
NPV of palm oil per hectare $ 16,334.26
BEP of Carbon (P ∗) $ 72.60
BEP of CO2 $ 19.78
The BEP is estimated to be as large as $72.60 per ton of carbon or $19.78 per
ton of carbon dioxide. The average carbon price of the EU ETS in 2011 is
$23.86 per ton of carbon or $6.5 per ton of carbon dioxide (World Bank 2012).
The result suggests that the revenue from oil palm plantation outweighs the
carbon revenue in Central Kalimantan. Thus, the REDD+ scheme will not
be able to fulfill its objective of avoiding deforestation caused by oil palm ex-
pansion. This BEP can be observed in the situation in which all deforestation
occurs because of oil palm expansion. This is extreme assumption, however,
as rice and rubber cultivation are still causes of deforestation (Grieg-Gran,
2008). However, the high productivity of oil palms should increase the rate
of oil palm expansion. When giving the carbon value and oil palm expansion
the competition, it is necessary for a REDD+ scheme to be implemented to
combine the carbon value with other forest protection or law enforcement
values. The value of forest protection in our estimation excludes some fac-
tors that increase the value of forest protection. Payments for environmental
services (PES) or bellow-ground carbon would increase compensation from
protecting the forest by decreasing the BEP. Another possibility is that the
government can freeze oil palm expansion; the moratorium that the govern-
ments of Indonesia and Norway singed is an certain example of this.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the effectiveness of a REDD+ mechanism in Cen-
tral Kalimantan. The BEP in Central Kalimantan is estimated to be $15.45
per ton of carbon or $4.21 per ton of carbon dioxide and this is below the
average carbon price of EU ETS in 2009 ($46.48 per ton of carbon or $12.7
per ton of carbon dioxide, reported in the World Bank (2010)). So a carbon
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fixation activity is more profitable than rice and rubber plantation. REDD+
would provide an alternative to stakeholders and has a great potential to
generate forest protection in this area. As well as reducing carbon emissions,
REDD+ holds out the prospect of providing economic gain to Central Kali-
mantan that exceeds the current revenue from rice and rubber plantations.
As our field survey suggests, increases in the price of rubber would lead to
deforestation. To achieve the goal of reducing carbon emissions worldwide,
attention should be paid to the impact of natural resource prices on farmers’
behavior in developing countries. A REDD+ mechanism can offer developing
countries an incentive to participate in international negotiations. Combin-
ing this mechanism with other policy tools that can help protect forests
would contribute to reducing carbon emissions and to building sustainable
development.
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Chapter 4
What Factors Promote
Peatland Fire Prevention?
Evidence from Central
Kalimantan, Indonesia
This study evaluates the impact of a REDD+ pilot project on farmers’ behav-
ior. We combine household survey data and satellite information to investi-
gate the effects of the Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership (KFCP)
project on fire prevention in carbon-thick peatland of Central Kalimantan,
Indonesia. We find that the project fails to promote farmers’ fire prevention.
This can be attributed to the fact that KFCP has not changed the incentives
for households to prevent fire at their agricultural plots. On the other hand,
the impact of other economic factors as the value of labor allocation for rub-
ber production and the impact of non-economic factors as traditional mutual
assistance, called Goton-royong were statistically significant. The results of
our analysis suggest that a design for effective REDD+ policy should contain
appropriate combination of economic and non-economic incentives.
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4.1 Introduction
REDD+ has been a focus of international discussion as an efficient climate
change policy. The basic function of REDD+ is to offer developing countries
an opportunity for financial support from developed countries in response to
avoiding carbon emissions through forest conservation thereby reducing the
conflict between developed and developing nations regarding global warming
negotiations. Deveny et al. (2009) assess the capacity for implementing
REDD+ in each country using the Forest Carbon Index (FCI). They give
Indonesia a high evaluation along with Brazil, Russia, Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia.
One of the key issues for implementing REDD+ in Indonesia is the high
risk of peatland fire. Forestland in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia is com-
posed of thick peat swamp and 2,000-6,000 metric tons of carbon per hectare
(t C/ha), compared to the average 225 t C/ha in moist tropical forests in
southeast Asia (Page et al., 1999; IPCC, 2006). Once peat has been ignited,
the burning of its organic-rich materials is hard to put out and it releases its
carbon into the atmosphere. For example, during a large-scale peatland fire
in 1997, the total carbon dioxide emission from Indonesia was estimated to be
between 0.81 and 2.57 gigatons, which is equal to 13–40 percent of the mean
annual global carbon emissions from fossil fuels (Page et al., 2002). The com-
bination of fire and the vast amount of carbon released made Indonesia the
third largest Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emitter in the world (Myers Madeira,
2008).
In 2008, the governments of Indonesia and Australia jointly announced
the Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership (KFCP), one of the world’s first
REDD+ pilot projects. The project aimed to reduce GHG emissions from
deforestation and peatland fires by involving farmers in fire prevention and
reducing the use of fire at individual plots. With a significant budget, KFCP
was expected to be effective REDD+. However, the impact of the project is
currently unclear, and has yet to be thoroughly evaluated. The results ob-
tained by our analysis suggest that KFCP might not have offered appropriate
incentives for farmers to promote fire prevention behavior at individual plots.
While fire prevention is an important aspect of forest and climate pol-
icy, it has not been seriously addressed in economic literature. An exception
54
is Bowman et al. (2008) who investigated household decision making con-
cerning fire prevention in the Brazilian Amazon. They explored the factors
that affected household decisions on fire prevention and found that economic
factors (e.g., the value of labor allocation for agriculture) plays a significant
role in promoting individual fire prevention. As the value of labor alloca-
tion to agriculture increases, households become more productive in crop
production; hence, there is a greater expected benefit of fire prevention.
This study extends prior research by estimating a household labor allo-
cation model. The main contributions of this study are as follows. Firstly,
we evaluated the impact of the KFCP project and found that this program
was insufficient to change household decisions on fire prevention. KFCP was
one of the earliest of the 15 REDD+ pilot projects undertaken throughout
the world prior to 2009 (Carlson, 2009). While some studies have addressed
the consequences of REDD+ pilot projects using descriptive approach (Re-
sosudarmo et al., 2012; Olbrei and Howes, 2012), there are no studies that
evaluate the impact of REDD+ pilot projects at the household level using
an econometric analysis. Secondly, we estimated the household labor al-
location model by combining data from the household survey with global
NASA/MODIS satellite data. Satellite information is useful for considering
fire risk objectively and investigating fire prevention comprehensively. In our
analysis, the number of hot spots observed by satellite is used as a variable
explaining the degree of fire risk. Thirdly, we hypothesized that social fac-
tors, not only economic factors, play an important role in fire prevention. We
focused on the mutual assistance custom called Gotong-royong as being an
important factor in the decision making regarding household labor allocation
for fire prevention. Gotong-royong includes a wide range of group activities
in the community, such as providing labor to clear agricultural plots, the
construction and repair of public infrastructure, guarding the village, and
financial support. This behavior provides the community with social norms
and serves as a determinant of social capital based on the norms that are
generally observable in urban and rural Indonesia (Bowen, 1986).
Recent studies on development recognize the importance of social capital
in the self-governance of common property resources (Ostrom, 1990). In-
donesia is a suitable place to evaluate the impact of social capital on REDD+
schemes because households have traditionally been involved in the commu-
55
nity through Gotong-royong. Policy makers in Indonesia have noted the
importance of Gotong-royong on social improvement, and have used this in-
volvement to improve health care, education, sanitation and ﬁnancial support
(Wibisana et al., 1999). Since the eﬀect of ﬁre prevention behavior depends
in part on the behavior of neighbors, it is important to take into account the
relationships within the community. While many studies have considered the
role of social capital in development and environmental policy (Feigenberg,
2010; Sujarwoto, 2013), no studies have examined its eﬀect in the context of
REDD+.
4.2 Household model
We develop a subsistence household model to determine the factors that en-
courage households to allocate their time for ﬁre prevention. Households
are assumed to allocate family labor for rice cultivation, rubber cultivation,
oﬀ-farm work, ﬁre prevention, and leisure (Beukering, 2008; Yamamoto and
Takeuchi, 2012). In our model, a household is both a producer and a con-
sumer of agricultural goods, and thus, labor allocation depends mainly on
consumption needs (Fisher et al., 2005). Households have a quasi-concave
utility function:
max
Cr,Cm,l
U = U(Cr, Cm, l; Ω), (4.2.1)
where Cr, Cm, l, and Ω are the consumption of rice, that of composite pur-
chased goods, that of leisure time, and the household’s characteristics, re-
spectively. The utility is maximized subject to the production functions for
rice, rubber and oﬀ-farm work, a full income constraint, a time constraint,
and non-negativity constraints:
Qr = Qr(Lr, Kr; Ω), (4.2.2)
Qg = Qg(Lg, Kg, Lp; Ω), (4.2.3)
Qo = Qo(Lo; Ω), (4.2.4)
Y = Pr(Qr Cr) + PgjQg + PoQo PmCm, (4.2.5)
l = T Lr Lg Lo Lp, (4.2.6)
Cr, Cm, l, Qr, Qg, Qo, Lr, Lg, Lp, Lo ⇔0. (4.2.7)
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Equations (2) and (3) describe, respectively, the production of rice and rub-
ber, which are assumed to be functions of labor (Lr and Lg), capital (Kr and
Kg), household characteristics (Ω), and, for rubber production, labor input
for ﬁre prevention (Lp). Households can reduce their risk of ﬁre damage and
increase the associated beneﬁt of rubber production by allocating labor for
ﬁre prevention. Fire prevention (Lp) does not enter into the production func-
tion for rice because households in this area have adapted to the risk of ﬁre,
changing their period of cultivation to avoid ﬁre damage. They have less risk
of ﬁre in the rainy season (from October to March) and typically cultivate
rice in this period.
Equation (4) describes the oﬀ-farm work function requiring labor input
(Lo).
1 We assume that the production functions for rice Qr(×), rubber Qg(×),
and oﬀ-farm work Qo(×) have decreasing returns to scale. Equation (5) de-
scribes a household’s full income constraint. A household can be either a
net seller or buyer of rice (Qr > Cr or Qr < Cr). Households sell their
rubber crops at the local price Pgj, but do not buy any rubber crops. They
can also earn Po by allocating oﬀ-farm work Qo. Households buy composite
goods (Cm) at market price (Pm). Equation (6) describes a household’s time
constraint.
The Lagrangian of the household’s maximization problem is represented
as
{ = U(Cr, Cm, l; Ω)
λ}Y Pr(Qr(Lr, Kr; Ω) Cr) PgjQg(Lg, Kg, Lp; Ω)
PoQo(Lo; Ω) + PmCm| + γ(T Lr Lg Lo Lp). (4.2.8)
The ﬁrst-order conditions can be derived as
∂{
∂Lp
= λPgj
∂Qg
∂Lp
γ = 0, (4.2.9)
∂{
∂Lo
= λPo
∂Qo
∂Lo
γ = 0, (4.2.10)
∂{
∂Cr
= λPr, (4.2.11)
1We deﬁne oﬀ-farm work here as work hours spent outside of ones’ own agricultural
plot. This includes working on the another’s plot, hunting, logging, driving boats or
motorcycles, construction and working for the KFCP project.
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∂{
∂Cm
= λPm. (4.2.12)
Equations (9) and (10) show that at the optimum, households allocate labor
for each activity until the expected marginal beneﬁt is equal to the marginal
opportunity cost of household time (γ). This suggests that marginal beneﬁt
and cost are prime candidates to be determinants of ﬁre prevention.
Slutsky equations help us understand the implications of the models. It
is possible to divide the total eﬀect of a slight change in marginal beneﬁt of
ﬁre prevention into substitution and income eﬀects:
∂Lp
∂Wp
=
∂Lp
∂Wp
√U=U¯ +
∂Lp
∂Y
Qg, (4.2.13)
where Wp stands for the marginal beneﬁt of labor allocation for ﬁre preven-
tion (Pgj
∂Qg
∂Lp
). The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Equation (13) is a
substitution eﬀect; the second term is an income eﬀect. The substitution
eﬀect must be positive because a higher marginal value of prevention would
increase net beneﬁt of rubber production. The sign of the income eﬀect is
ambiguous; it depends on the relationship between income and leisure time.
Findings from empirical studies on agricultural production suggest that the
substitution eﬀect outweighs the income eﬀect in developing countries; there-
fore, the total eﬀect might be positive (Fisher, 2005; Shively, 2004). The
eﬀect of a slight change in the marginal beneﬁt of oﬀ-farm work on the labor
allocation for ﬁre prevention can be described as follows:
∂Lp
∂Wo
=
∂Lp
∂Wo
√U=U¯ +
∂Lp
∂Y
(Qo), (4.2.14)
whereWo is the marginal beneﬁt of labor allocation for oﬀ-farm work (Po
∂Qo
∂Lo
).
The substitution eﬀect of the ﬁrst term is non-positive, while the income
eﬀect of the second term is indeterminate. This is because the term ∂LP/∂Y
can be either positive or negative depending on the demand for oﬀ-farm
work and leisure time. Findings from previous empirical studies suggest
that the total eﬀect might be negative, and that increasing oﬀ-farm wages
decreases engagement in agricultural work in developing countries (Jolliﬀe,
2004; Shively and Fisher, 2004).2 With this point in mind, we empirically
2Previous studies ﬁnd that increasing oﬀ-farm wages decrease the deforestation ra-
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investigate the relationship between the marginal benefit of labor allocation
for rubber production or off-farm work and labor allocation to fire prevention.
Economic incentives offered by policy intervention can play a similar role
as a marginal increase in the value of rubber production. A certain economic
incentive for fire prevention (ρ) offered by a policy (KFCP, for example) in-
creases the a household’s expected marginal benefit of allocating labor for
fire prevention activities (λ(Pgj)
∂Qg
∂Lp
+ρ(Lp)). The KFCP project announced
that 30 million US dollars had been funded to mitigate deforestation in 14
communities in Blocks A and E of Kapuas Regency, this comprises 120,000
hectares of heavily degraded peatland and forests. KFCP was designed to
promote household forest conservation and fire prevention activities by pro-
viding economic incentives. The project design document of KFCP describes
three categories for incentives: (1) input-based incentives, such as building
dams, planting trees, growing nursery plants, and eliminating fire use on
peat soils; (2) performance-based incentives, such as maintaining dams to
keep water levels high, protecting forests from encroachment, and reducing
the incidence and extent of fires; and (3) outcome-based incentives, such as
payment for actual reduced GHG emissions (KFCP, 2009, p.24). When insuf-
ficient economic incentives have been provided, the impact of KFCP is zero:
ρ(Lp) = 0. In our interview conducted from October to December in 2012,
all households in Blocks A and E reported that they had not received any
economic incentives from KFCP for fire prevention at their plots, while some
of them reported that they had received incentives for preparing nurseries
for reforestation or for planting on project plot. This suggests that input-
based incentives is offered rather than performance-based or outcome-based
incentives.
Non-economic factors might also affect household fire prevention deci-
sions. The role of social capital has received a great deal of attention in
the context of effective management of common property resources (Ostrom,
1990). Fire prevention by individual farmers has the characteristics of the
private provision of public goods because it might reduce the risk of peatland
fire on surrounding farmland. The existence of the mutual assistance cus-
tio because they assume that off-farm work and agriculture are substitutional work and
that additional agriculture work increases the ratio of deforestation. This factor is not
considered in this paper.
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tom Gotong-royong allows us to evaluate the impact of social capital on fire
prevention. Gotong-royong is a traditional community involvement and co-
operative agricultural activities. For example, farmers jointly clear grass and
harvest rice with nearby family as labor exchange or cooperation (Bowen,
1986). It also involves a wide range of reciprocal activity, from providing
labor for infrastructure construction to financial support. This tradition af-
fects individuals to exhibit a normative behavior for community. We examine
the effect of Gotong-royong on fire prevention by using a dummy variable of
participation in this activity.
4.3 Data
We collected household data via face-to-face interviews in twenty-nine com-
munities in Kapuas Regency, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia (Figure 4.1).
The communities were selected to obtain a balance of ethnicities and degree
of involvement in the KFCP project. The communities consisted of 11 trans-
migrant and 18 Dayak tribe communities. Of the 18 Dayak communities, six
were involved with the KFCP project. Table 1 summarizes the composition
of the communities.3
In the interviews, respondents were asked about their economic status,
type of agriculture, demographic characteristics, experience of fire damage,
and fire prevention activities. Although we collected information from a total
of 288 randomly selected households, in order to focus on the decisions of
household heads, we excluded 73 responses by non-household heads and 35
responses with incomplete data.4 Thus, the final number of observations for
3Two types of people have settled in Kapuas Regency: indigenous Dayak tribes that
have traditionally lived there, and transmigrants that moved from other islands of In-
donesia or other parts of Kalimantan (Fearnside, 1997). Transmigration to this area was
promoted by government policy, especially during the Mega-Rice Project (MRP) in the
1990s. Although the government abandoned the MRP, a number of transmigrants contin-
ued to live in the area as rice farmers. Both communities rely on agricultural produce as
their main source of income (De Jong et al., 2001).
4For example, we left out respondents who do not engage in agriculture or who do not
own any agricultural plots.
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Figure 4.1: Geographical representation of Kapuas Regency.
the analysis was 182. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the
sample, which was divided into households that engage in fire prevention
more than 60 days a year and those that do not, as well as those that were
involved in the KFCP project and those that were not.
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Table 4.1: Settlement composition
Ethnicity
No. Name of Village Dayak Transmigrant KFCP site
1. Sei Ahas
2. Katimpun
3. Sei Kayu
4. Mampai
5. Sei Tatas
6. Sei Pitung
7. Sei Kayu
8. Mandomai
9. Mambulau
10. Dahirang
11. Sei Pasah
12. Penda Katapi
13. Lamunti A2
14. Lamunti B1
15. Lamunti B2
16. Dadahup G3
17. Dadahup G1
18. Dadahup G2
19. Dadahup A1
20. Dadahup A6
21. Dadahup A5
22. Palingkau SP1
23. Palingkau SP2
24. Jangkang
25. Kalumpang
26. Tumbang Mangkup
27. Tarantang
28. Pulau Kaladan
29. Mantangai Hulu
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Table 2 suggests that households in the area are faced with a high risk
of fire damage. 38% of the households have experienced accidental fire dam-
age on their agricultural plots. To reduce the risk of fire damage, 88% of
the households have been engaging in fire prevention activities, either by
patrolling (78%) or clearing grass (81%). We define a household as a fire
prevention participator if it has engaged in patrolling or clearing grass at
individual plots for fire prevention within the past 12 months prior to the
interview.5 Households engaging in fire prevention more than 60 days a year
tend to be exposed to a higher risk of fire damage. Experience of fire damage
and the number of total hot spots nearby are higher for them than for others.
Households living in areas where the KFCP project has been implemented
seem more likely to engage in fire prevention than others. This may contain
a reverse causality since the KFCP project has been implemented in areas
where the risk of fire is higher. As a result, the number of hot spots in the
KFCP project area is typically higher than places not involved with KFCP.
To take this bias to our empirical estimation, we use instrumental variable
methods. The dummy variable for the KFCP site is controlled by the num-
ber of hot spots from 2001 to 2007. Since KFCP began in 2008, the risk of
fire from 2001 to 2007 might be suitable to control the endogeneity of policy
site choice.
The estimated mean shadow wage of rubber cultivation is 16,483 rupiahs
for the full sample.6 There are substantial differences in this figure between
households that engage in fire prevention and those that do not. The esti-
mated mean shadow wage of rubber cultivation for households that engage
in fire prevention less than 60 days is 12,536 rupiahs, while that for house-
5The exact wording of the questionnaire is, “Do you clear grass on your land to prevent
fires?” and “Do you look around your land carefully to prevent fires?”.
6To define the opportunity cost of rubber production time, we estimated the produc-
tion function. The F-statistic of the estimation is 38.17 with 127 degrees of freedom. The
annual amount of rubber produced by households was used as the dependent variable. The
independent variables that were statistically significant (P < 0.01) were household labor
time (+), capital input (+), hired labor (+), chemical fertilizer input (+), years since the
rubber was planted (+), and square of years since the rubber was planted ( ). Chemical
input and experience of fire damage were statistically insignificant. The estimated coef-
ficient for the household labor time variable was used as the opportunity cost of rubber
production time in the analysis of this section.
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holds engage in ﬁre prevention more than 60 days is 19,188 rupiahs. The
mean shadow wage of exogenous income is 14,021 for households engaging
in ﬁre prevention less than 60 days, and that for households engaging in ﬁre
prevention more than 60 days is 9,525.21 rupiahs.
We deﬁne a household as a Gotong-royong participators if they have
participated in any mutual activities, such as agricultural cooperation, con-
structing infrastructure, or maintaining public facilities for the community,
in the 12 months prior to the interview. Table 2 suggests that Gotong-royong
participators are more likely to engage in ﬁre prevention than those not in-
volved in Gotong-royong (74% and 49%).
4.4 Empirical Results
As Equation (9) suggests, households will not engage in ﬁre prevention if the
marginal beneﬁt of ﬁre prevention (λPgj
∂Qg
∂Lp
) is less than the value of time
(γ). This can be described as the corner solution of zero ﬁre prevention,
where λPg
∂Qg
∂Lp
< γ ∈ Lp = 0. Since our sample contains households whose
level of ﬁre prevention is zero, we use a Poisson regression model and a Tobit
model to consider the selection bias for estimation.
ln(Lp) = β0 + βeXe + βsXs + βfXf , (4.4.1)
where Xe is a vector of explanatory variables of economic factors, Xs is a
vector of explanatory variables of non-economic factors, such as household
characteristics, decisions and KFCP intervention, and Xf is a vector of ex-
planatory variables of the risk of ﬁre damage such as experience of ﬁre damage
and the number of hot spots in 2012.7
To evaluate the impact of KFCP, we must consider policy endogeneity
since there is a possibility that households in the KFCP site are more likely to
engage in ﬁre prevention–not because of the project, but because of the higher
risk of ﬁre damage. To take this bias into account, we used the instrumental
7Hot spot data in our analysis cover the entire Kapuas Regency, from 114.000 to 114.450
degrees east longitude and from 2.05 to 3.40 degrees south latitude in the period from 2001
to 2012. We counted the number of hot spots on basis of 532 meshes that divided the
Kapuas Regency with 0.05 degrees of longitude and 0.025 of latitude.
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variable method. The instrument used in our analysis is the total number of
hot spots observed by MODIS from 2001 to 2007. Since the project started in
2008, the hot spots from 2001 to 2007 can be considered as having an impact
on KFCP site selection, but not on households fire prevention decision in
2012. Thus, we can mitigate the endogeneity caused by KFCP site selection.
This is estimated with a IV-Tobit model.
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The estimation results for each category of prevention activity, patrolling
and clearing grass, and both, are summarized in Table 3, Table 4 and Table
5, which show the respective specifications. The first specification (Column
1) uses a Poisson estimation and the second specification (Column 2) uses
a Tobit model to take the sample selection biases into account. The third
specification (Column 3) uses the instrumental variable method for the Tobit
model. Table 6 shows the results of the first-stage regression for IV-Tobit
models.
We found that the coefficients of KFCP are statistically insignificant in
all estimations, indicating that the impact of KFCP is not enough to cause
households to allocate additional time for fire prevention. This might be
because KFCP has not offered payments for fire prevention on individual
plots. Instead of offering performance-based or outcome-based incentives,
most of KFCP project have focused on input-based incentives. For example,
households reported that KFCP has rewarded them for preparing nurseries
for reforestation or for planting on project plots. Such rewards can consti-
tute an increase in households’ exogenous income, which may create negative
incentive for fire prevention activity. By increasing households’ exogenous in-
come, KFCP can deprive households of incentives to allocate labor for fire
prevention at their own plots. As the coefficient of the shadow wage of
off-farm work is negative and statistically significant, this might be plau-
sible. Furthermore, KFCP might be insufficient in providing information
and knowledge on its strategies. Resosudarmo et al. (2012) compared the
knowledge of villagers between several REDD+ pilot projects and found that
KFCP is relatively less acknowledged by local residents. The reason KFCP
employed input-based incentives is because of the high cost of monitoring of
individual behavior. The high cost of implementing performance-based or
outcome-based incentive are at the center of the international discussion on
REDD+ as measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) problem.
The estimation results suggest that in general, economic factors have a
significant effect on decision making for fire prevention. The coefficient of the
shadow wage of rubber production is positive and statistically significant at
the 5% level at least in most of the estimations, indicating that households
with higher values of rubber work are more likely to allocate labor for fire
prevention. A higher rubber product value creates an incentive for house-
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Table 4.6: KFCP site selection, ﬁrst stage regression
Independent variable Probit IV
Coeﬃcient
(Robust S.E.)
Coeﬃcient
(Robust S.E.)
Number of hot spots observed from 2001 to 2007
2.426∗∗∗
(0.354)
0.139∗∗∗
(0.038)
Participate in Gotong-royong
0.398
(0.813)
0.040
(0.065)
Shadow wage of rubber products
0.287∗∗∗
(0.069)
0.008∗
(0.004)
Shadow wage of oﬀ-farm work
0.071∗
(0.041)
0.004
(0.003)
Amount of rice product cultivated last year
0.047
(0.078)
0.013
(0.008)
Number of hot spots observed in 2012
1.007∗∗
(0.469)
0.110∗∗
(0.048)
Experienced ﬁre damage in last ﬁve year
2.504∗∗∗
(0.443)
0.160∗∗∗
(0.051)
Number of household members
1.221∗∗
(0.488)
0.016
(0.052)
Number of children age < 6
1.678∗∗∗
(0.346)
0.052
(0.044)
Access time to market
2.479∗∗∗
(0.372)
0.189∗∗∗
(0.042)
Age of household head
0.220∗∗∗
(0.079)
0.009
(0.010)
Square age of household head
0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
Transmigrant
4.502∗∗∗
(0.612)
0.429∗∗
(0.167)
Number of years on lot
1.139∗∗
(0.473)
0.019
(0.142)
Agriculture as primary source of income
0.695
(0.734)
0.099∗
(0.060)
Total size of agricultural plot
0.406
(0.361)
0.017
(0.042)
Size of burned plot for agriculture
1.880∗∗∗
(0.646)
0.104∗
(0.057)
Constant
12.566∗∗∗
(3.703)
0.306
(0.518)
Number of observations 182 182
Pseudo R2 0.853
≥≥≥, ≥≥, and ≥= statistically signiﬁcant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Cluster standard
errors are given in parentheses under the estimated coeﬃcients.
Independent variables except for dummies are in log form.
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holds to protect themselves from fire damage. This result is consistent with
Bowman et al. (2008), who found that the shadow wage of agricultural work
has positive and statistically significant effect on household decision making
on fire prevention. The coefficients of the shadow wage of off-farm work are
negative and statistically significant, indicating that an increasing off-farm
wage increases the opportunity cost of time (γ), and a high opportunity cost
leads households not to allocate their time for fire prevention. These results
mean that agricultural work and off-farm work are substitutes for households
in this area and the substitution effect outweighs the income effect. The total
effect of Equation (13) is positive and that of Equation (14) is negative.
The coefficients of Gotong-royong are positive and statistically significant
in most of the estimation, indicating that the households that participate in
Gotong-royong are more likely to engage in fire prevention. Since Gotong-
royong reinforces community’s norms and ethics, it leads households to coop-
erate with each other. Another possibility is that Gotong-royong plays the
role of a mutual surveillance system, allowing farmers to know what their
neighbor are doing at their agricultural plots. This can function as peer
pressure for more extensive fire prevention.
The coefficients of the experience of fire damage and the number of hot
spots in 2012 are positive but statistically insignificant in the estimations.
These results suggest that prevention activities by households might be based
on subjective risk perception. Empirical findings show that households in
developing countries are typically defined as risk-averse (Rosenzweigh and
Binswanger, 1993; Morduch, 1995; Barrett 1999; Shively, 2001).
4.5 Conclusions
This study estimated household labor allocation models by combining house-
hold survey data and satellite information for Kapuas Regency, Central Kali-
mantan, Indonesia. On the basis of the results, we can conclude that peatland
fire prevention can be promoted by economic and non-economic incentives.
This suggests that the REDD+ intervention incentive scheme would be able
to mitigate the risk of peatland fire as long as the design of the incentives is
appropriate.
The effect of KFCP was not found to be statistically significant in our
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results. While KFCP was expected to be an ideal model to mitigate the risk
of peatland fire, we found that it has no impact on household fire prevention
decisions. This can be attributed to the fact that KFCP failed to develop an
appropriate incentive scheme. For example, KFCP pays households planting
or preparing trees for reforestation projects, but not for fire prevention. In-
creasing this kind of payment might decrease the amount of labor allocation
for fire prevention since increasing the attractiveness of off-farm work would
deprive households of their willingness to allocate labor for fire prevention.
Economic factors play a significant role in policy implementation. Increas-
ing the productivity of rubber (the shadow wage of rubber production) would
be an incentive for households to increase their labor share of fire prevention
activity; however, increasing exogenous income may deprive households of
their willingness to engage in fire prevention.
Non-economic factors are also important for effective policy implementa-
tion. Mutual assistance customs such as Gotong-royong might enhance the
relationships between and the responsibility of households in the community.
Thus, households that participate in Gotong-royong activities tend to allo-
cate more labor and time for fire prevention at individual plots. Toghether,
these findings provide policy implications for the mitigation of forest fire and
deforestation in Central Kalimantan as well as in other tropical regions. The
high cost of implementing incentive schemes and the difficulty in monitoring
individual actions known as MRV problem are the center at international dis-
cussion on REDD+. Policy design should include mutual pressure from each
household and appropriate economic incentives to secure implementation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This paper investigates the economic potential of REDD+ in Central Kali-
mantan, Indonesia based on economic analysis and field survey data. We find
that REDD+ is potentially beneficial for mitigating global climate change, al-
though some issues are remain before international agreement can be reached.
The findings of this paper provide the policy implications of REDD+ in
Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. Forests in other tropical regions face similar
issues concerning wildfire, agricultural expansion, and property rights. Our
implications may be applicable not only to Indonesia, but also to these other
regions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, we re-
view various challenges of REDD+ implementation, for example, monitoring
and setting baselines that affect the benefit of each country. While various
issues can make reaching an agreement difficult, REDD+ has gained mo-
mentum as a means to mitigate climate change. Secondly, we investigate the
economic viability of REDD+ by estimating the BEP in Central Kalimantan.
The results of our BEP estimation show that REDD+ can offer an opportu-
nity for Central Kalimantan to reduce deforestation at current the price of
carbon at the EU ETS. This indicates that REDD+ would reduce the conflict
in international negotiation concerning climate change by offering incentives
for developing countries to participate in its scheme. However, the increasing
price of palm oil and rubber material will sharply increase the opportunity
cost of forest protection in Indonesia. Farmers would change their choice of
crops in response to a change in the price of crops. We must therefore pay
attention to the changes in international material prices. Thirdly, we inves-
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tigate the factors promoting local peatland fire prevention activities. The
results show that non-economic factors play a significant role in the reduc-
tion of peatland fire. This suggests that the policy design of REDD+ should
include non-economic incentives as well as economic incentives to secure im-
plementation. Our fire prevention estimation results suggest that inappropri-
ate incentives can lead REDD+ to failed in promoting forest protection. We
evaluated the impacts of KFCP and found that it does not change farmers’
activities. KFCP fails to develop an appropriate incentive scheme because
monetary incentives have not been provided in the project site. Policy design
must take into account non-economic incentives for implementing REDD+
effectively.
On the basis of the findings in this paper, we can conclude that REDD+
has the economic potential to reduce carbon emissions from forest sectors
in developing countries. REDD+ can also contribute to the reduction of
local poverty by providing economic incentives. However, REDD+ will not
be able to attract developing countries (i.e. indigenous people) to partici-
pate in the scheme unless appropriate incentives are provided. While many
policy designs have been assumed in its implementation, we suggest that
REDD+ should also be considered in terms of setting incentive schemes to
maximize the number of participators. We also find that REDD+ might be
able to provide low-cost performance by including non-economic incentives.
The high cost of implementing incentive schemes and the difficulty in mon-
itoring individual actions are at the center of the international discussion
on REDD+ as an MRV problem. Our findings can contribute to promoting
policy agreement on REDD+.
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